By Carl J. Bobrow
By 1909 it was becoming more and more apparent that in
future wars the skies above the earth would no longer play a benign role. Since
the early nineteenth century the use of the balloon by the military in many
countries, for reconnaissance purposes, had gained a wider acceptance. In the
first decade of the twentieth century this predominantly passive observation
deck would give way to newer and more effective contrivances for
reconnoitering, specifically the aeroplane and the dirigible. It is easy for us
to say from hind sight that these inventions would play an important role in
the way that future wars would be fought and how European society as a whole
would respond to the "threat from the sky". It should be noted that
there were influential individuals at that time who believed that neither
invention could or would provide any significant military value. Just as there
were obtuse detractors who initially suppressed the militaries involvement in
aviation, there were brilliant visionaries who saw the realistic possibilities
that these new invention would provide and forged ahead regardless.
It is quite curious that both the aeroplane and the
dirigible came into being almost at the same time. Although the dirigible
showed promise early on for commercial as well as military use, with its
extended range and high load carrying capabilities, the airships inherent
weaknesses eventually forced its use to be limited. Aside from the
psychological impact, due in no small way to its formidable size, it would
eventually prove to be ineffectual in war. We need to keep this fact in
perspective for it was not to be realized by the belligerents until it was
tested under war time conditions. In the rush to maintain a balance of power
England, France, Russia and Italy found themselves in a lopsided race to keep
up with Germany's ongoing development and utilization of what was popularly
known as the Zeppelin. This in itself would help spur the development of
military aviation throughout Europe.
The stunning psychosociological reaction which resulted
after the historic flight by Louis Bleriot across the English Channel in 1909
reverberated in England for decades. Their island home, touted to be a fortress
protected by the world’s most powerful Navy, was now vulnerable by air. The
concern of the populace was not simply for their personal safety, for it now
seemed their very way of life was in the balance. Via the daily tabloids they
came to the realization that military compounds, ammunition depots, rail
centers, communication centers and other strategic locations were now open to
aerial bombardment. It was even suggested that the Germans could covertly
launch a fleet of Zeppelins with enough soldiers to invade the English
homeland. It is important to remember there were but a handful of individuals
who truly understood the limited potential of the flying machines which existed
at that time.
The significance of the channel crossing was not missed by
the keen mind of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, who was in France at the
time. Upon his return to Russia he instituted the development of the All
Russian Aero Club. The purpose of the organization was not only to promote
aeronautical activities but to inform and inspire the public on all things
pertaining to flight. This was not unique to Russia, most of the European
continent was enthralled by the sportsmanlike activities which were exhibited
by the early fliers.
Though the military in general was led to aviation
reluctantly, there were those members of the various military branches who
immediately saw the vast potential of both the aeroplane and the dirigible. As
the development of flying machines progressed their reliability and usable
range increased. The use and the deployment of both the aeroplane and the
dirigible expanded both commercially and militarily. Many of the fanciful
notions held by both the public and the military of what these apparatuses
could achieve were soon swept away by the grim realities of war.
It soon became apparent that aerial observation of ground
activities would be crucial to the war effort. The development of the aeroplane
underwent a rapid maturation, with aircraft for specialized use constantly
evolving in order to fulfill the conditions required at the various theaters of
conflict. The captive balloon which proved effective for the trench warfare
type of struggle, which the First World War had become, was limited in its
observation range and thus was useful only at the immediate front.
The need for long range reconnaissance for observing the
rear staging areas was vital. On the western front such operations eventually
were accomplished by the successful use of two seat observation planes which
flew at high altitudes. As the war went on the use of the dirigible proved
largely ineffective for daytime operations. Their intended use for long range
reconnaissance as well as daylight bombing eventually was taken over by the
aeroplane. At the onset of hostilities the aeroplane as a whole was still
limited in operational range as well as usable payload. Only Russia and Italy
entered the war with aircraft which could effectively provide the military with
both long range reconnaissance and bombing capabilities.
The German high command had put their faith in the giant airships;
once again a few visionaries realized that large multi-engined aeroplanes were
to be the future. The Germans were well acquainted with the development of
Russia's long range reconnaissance/bombers, probably more so than anyone else.
It is interesting to note that one of their first attempts to fill this gap was
a design based closely upon Sikorsky's Il'ya Muromets. How much of an influence
the Murometsy had on both the decision to build the R-planes (an abbreviation
of Riesenflugzeug, the giant German bombers) in Germany and their initial design
parameters is open to speculation. The German military command was quite aware
of the fledgling Murometsy squadrons, since their unopposed sorties into the
German rear on the eastern front caused more than a mere annoyance. They must
have realized that such an aeroplane would provide them with the long range
strategic weapon that they desired. It seems reasonable to believe that these
deep intrusions into their territory had some influence on their decision to
build their Giants, particularly in view of their expeditious development and
use. Only after a concerted effort to fill this military and technological void
did the other warring nations develop their own large multi-engined aeroplanes
for long range reconnaissance and bombing. How the Russians, whose industrial
base was only in its infancy at the turn of the century, could produce a design
that was effectively years ahead of any other nation is an interesting story.
PHOTO # 1 The world’s first multi-engined enclosed cabin
aeroplane popularly known as the Grand. This aircraft first flew in the spring
of 1913, until it was severely damaged in a freak accident while on the ground.
This flying testbed launched Igor Sikorsky's long career in heavy aviation.
[Courtesy of Sikorsky Aircraft/UTC] By the age of twenty-four, Igor Ivanovich
Sikorsky had already demonstrated his adept ability as an aircraft designer.
Many of his designs were as innovative as they were successful. Some of these
aircraft proved superior to both the foreign and domestic designs which were
entered into the national military trials. Sikorsky's meteoric rise in these
endeavors was due in part to his intuitive genius as well as his empirical
approach to problem solving. In his long career no greater challenge would be
faced than the design and construction of his multi-engined aeroplanes built in
Russia.
PHOTO # 2 The second Il'ya Muromets built, a type B, this
aircraft was given the name "Kievskiy" in honor of its achievements
by Czar Nicholas the II. In this aircraft Igor Sikorsky and a crew of three
made the epic 1,600 mile roundtrip flight from St. Petersburg to Kiev. Note the
passenger on the observation platform in front of the nose. [Courtesy of NASM]
After the successful construction of the world’s first and second multi-engined
enclosed cabin aeroplane Igor Sikorsky decided to demonstrate that his large
aircraft had a practical purpose. His plan called for a daring flight in his
most recently redesigned Il'ya Muromets, R-BVZ No. 128. On June 30, 1914
Sikorsky, with a crew of three which consisted of two copilots, Lieutenant G.I.
Lavrov of the Imperial Russian Navy, Captain K.F. Prussis of the Imperial
Russian Army, and his trusted mechanic, V.S. Panasiuk, took off from
Komendantsky Field near St. Petersburg for the 1,600 mile roundtrip flight to
Kiev. The trek was intended to subject the aeroplane to varying operational
conditions. Such a long distance flight would provide invaluable information
for future design criteria and Sikorsky was well aware of this. Although he had
successfully established world records for weight, altitude and duration in his
previous multi-engined designs, he was quick to realize that these flights were
not the same as the venture he was about to embark on. Manufacturing an
aircraft that was to operate as a long range transport would require a design
that could fly under various conditions. One practical way to recognize what
these parameters would be was to conduct a lengthy cross country flight.
Needless to say the publicity would benefit the company he worked for.
The Il'ya Muromets was provisioned with an ample supply of
fuel as well as numerous spare parts to help ensure a successful flight. They
had planned for only one stop near the city of Orsha for refueling. Aside from
this one site there were no other airfields along the way, the only hope for an
emergency landing would be one of the larger cultivated fields south of the
great forests. The brilliant success of their round trip flight proved not only
the viability of Igor Sikorsky's design but the possibility of long distance
transport by aeroplane. The effect on the Russian aviation community was
stunning, his designs would influence generations. Detailed news of the flight
reached an astonished audience in the rest of Europe as well as the United States.
Shortly after this epic flight an even more startling event unfolded which
certainly obscured the news of Sikorsky's accomplishment; this was the
assassination of Arch Duke Ferdinand and the subsequent outbreak of World War
One.
PHOTO # 3 Igor Sikorsky standing seventh from left, below
outboard engine of an Il'ya Muromets type B. This aircraft was delivered to the
military and was equipped with Salmson engines. Photo taken during the winter
of 1914-15.[Courtesy of Sikorsky Aircraft/UTC] With the commencement of
hostilities Mikhail V. Shidlovskiy, the Director of the Russo-Baltic Wagon
Company (R-BVZ) which built the Il'ya Muromets, for which Sikorsky was the
chief designer, quickly realized that he had the opportunity as well as the
obligation to help the Russian war effort. Having very close ties with the
Ministry of War he was able to persuade them to order a number of Il'ya
Muromets aircraft. He suggested that a squadron utilizing the Il'ya Muromets be
created. The idea was to fly and operate them much in the way that a naval
fleet works. Shidlovskiy and others felt the Il'ya Muromets not only possessed
the potential to operate as a long range reconnaissance aircraft but also as a
bomber and rightly so. This concept was a bold one for the time, as well as a
shrewd business deal since the order could only be filled by one firm, the
R-BVZ. Since 1909 it was widely believed that the dirigible would succeed in
these tasks. Although the Russians did have a few French built airships and a
few domestic made dirigibles in their service they were quickly shown to be
outmoded for this aspect of military duty by 1914. Although the Germans made
extensive use of their Zeppelins, particularly in the early stages of the war,
these were of a much better design than the type employed by the Russians or
for that matter anyone else. With this fact in mind Shidlovskiy's proposal
struck a chord. The acceptance of Shidlovskiy's suggestion by the Ministry of
War and the approval of Czar Nicholas II, led to the creation of the first
squadron of Murometsy and a contract to supply military versions of the Il'ya
Muromets.
Initially the existing civilian models were procured for
military use. As we shall see this would almost cause the demise of the whole
program. With the rush to establish this new squadron the need for experienced
pilots became paramount. Unfortunately at that time there were relatively few
military pilots who had the notion or inclination to join such a squadron. They
had neither the vision of how effective the Murometsy would be, or the
necessary training to fly and control such huge aircraft. These pilots, who
were familiar with small aeroplanes, mostly of foreign design, thought of
themselves as the Calvary of the air. Although many of them knew and admired
Igor Sikorsky this did not translate into a willingness to staff the squadron.
Yet not all of the officers of the Imperial Russian Air Force (IRAF) viewed the
formation of this squadron or the use of the Il'ya Muromets with such
skepticism. These officers and pilots who did join would form the nucleus of
what would eventually become the Squadron of Flying Ships (Escadra vozdushnykh
korabley, or EVK). Initially, as stated, the squadron was equipped with the
existing Murometsy, these aircraft were upgraded and modified in order to
fulfill the operational parameters which were required by the military. Instead
of sending these aircraft to the front by rail it was decided to allow them to
be flown to their forward locations. Although the pilots who flew the ships were
experienced flyers their lack of familiarity with this radically new design
almost signaled the death knell for the future use of the Il'ya Muromets and
the squadron as well. Since the pilots flying these aeroplanes were unable to
achieve the standards of performance as required by the military it was decided
to place all orders for the Il'ya Muromets on hold. Additionally the squadron
was ordered to stand down, temporarily at least.
Shidlovskiy believed that the real problem was
organizational, rather than the aircrafts inability to perform. He arose to
defend his aircraft and ideas vehemently, stating that failure to make use of
such an important weapon would be tantamount to a criminal act. With his
influential contacts in the Ministry of War as well as other branches of the
government M.V. Shidlovskiy was not only able to get these orders rescinded but
went on to obtain an appointment as the squadron's new commander with the rank
of Major General. Mikhail Shidlovskiy envisioned a squadron which would be self
contained operationally and insular from the normal command structure. Being an
ex-naval officer he was familiar with military regulations, procedure and
conduct. Both his organizational skills and his familiarity with the Il'ya
Muromets made him an excellent choice. It is interesting to note that
Shidlovskiy saw no conflict with the fact that he should both head the EVK and
also make money by supplying the IM's to the military. Such a feudalistic
throwback could only exist in Russia at that time.
PHOTO # 4 A forward EVK aerodrome, note the large tent type
hangers for the Murometsy, probably taken in early 1915.[Courtesy of Sikorsky
Aircraft/UTC] In December 1914 Shidlovskiy officially assumed command of the
EVK but it was not until January 1915 that the General had things organized
enough to send for Igor Sikorsky to join him at Yablonna, the EVK's forward
aerodrome near Warsaw. One of their first duties was to ascertain why the IM's
were not performing up to their normal operational parameters. They knew the
Il'ya Muromets were more than capable of exceeding the military's flight
requirements. Igor Sikorsky confirmed what General Shidlovskiy had suspected.
The lack of proper training and organization for both the pilots and the ground
crews had contributed to the poor performance. Sikorsky found the airframes
were no longer in an airworthy state, also the engines were running far below
their rated performance. Aside from these mechanical hindrances the lack of
advanced flight training for the pilots operating the Il'ya Muromets, with its
complex control system, had contributed to their initial failures. It did not
take General Shidlovskiy long to sort out the control and command problems, nor
did it take Igor Sikorsky much time to instruct the squadron in resolving the
difficulties encountered in both flying and maintaining the Murometsy.
PHOTO # 5 A jubilant flight and ground crew after a very
successful and important mission over enemy lines, early 1915.[Courtesy of
Sikorsky Aircraft/UTC] By February 1915 the EVK was commencing operations which
included long range strategic reconnaissance and bombing missions. As a result
of these first flights and their overwhelming successes the Stavka (the Supreme
High Command of the Russian Military) withdrew the command of the EVK from the
Field Inspector General of Aviation, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, and
placed the squadron under direct supervision of Stavka. The amount of sorties
flown increased significantly with the emphasis on reconnaissance, particularly
for the rear staging areas. It is quite evident from these actions that the
high command quickly realized the importance of the missions that the IM's were
capable of carrying out. Commensurate to all this the original order for the
Murometsy was increased as was the size of the squadron itself, so that by 1916
the squadron had substantially increased in size. At the EVK's zenith of
activity no less than thirty Murometsy were available for combat sorties. A
good many of the IM's which were built by the R-BVZ were employed as trainers.
As the squadron developed, a central base of operations was established at
Vinnitsa. From here regional squadrons were sent out to various field positions
to operate over the vast Russian front. Training courses were held at Vinnitsa
for both pilots, flight personnel, and the ground crews. Here under the
tutelage of an experienced staff, comprised of both pilots and technical
specialists, the next generation of the EVK was prepared to assume the rigors
and responsibilities awaiting them at the front.
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